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Abstract 
The paper gives a very brief overview about pricing 
concepts for digitized information goods. The main part 
of this analysis is devoted to the explanation of the fact, 
that despite of the existence of these pricing concepts, the 
price for almost all web versions of newspapers equals 
zero. For this purpose we conducted an investigation, 
focused on expert interviews with the managers of Aus-
trian online newspapers. The results of this study show 
why the price currently equals zero, how revenues for 
online newspapers may be achieved, and what the manag-
ers think about the theoretical pricing concepts. 
Definition of Digitized Information goods 
The term "digitized good" is applied to any good 
which exists in an electronic form, i.e., encoded as a 
string of bits and bytes (=digitized). What is decisive here 
is the fact that it not only can exist but does exist as a 
series of bits, which means it has to be digitized. This also 
constitutes the major difference to information goods. 
Information goods contain information, i.e., "descriptions 
of situations and processes" (Hansen 1996b), irrespective 
of whether this information is available on paper, papyrus, 
hewn in stone or on CD-rom. Thus, products ranging 
from books, databases, (electronic) newspapers, maga-
zines, films, and music are information goods. The char-
acteristic common to all information goods is that they are 
generally digitizable and can thus - theoretically - be 
distributed completely via an electronic network, with 
"completely" here denoting all stages in the transaction 
process, from initiating a deal to signing a contract up to 
payment and delivery. (Varian 1995). Information goods 
contain knowledge, therefore all digital goods are not 
automatically information goods. It becomes evident from 
the above mentioned that the sets of information goods 
and digital goods intersect, and it is this intersection 
which is relevant for this study. These considerations 
result in the following definition of digital information 
goods: 
1. A digital good is a good which exists in electronic 
form, i.e., encoded as a set of bits and bytes, and can 
thus be transferred via a network structure (e.g., 
computer programs). 
2. An information good is a good which is bought for its 
content. The good is actually the content, viz. the in-
formation/knowledge which it represents. Examples 
include fiction books, technical books, encyclopedias, 
newspapers, magazines, and manuals. 
3. A digital information good is a good which combines 
the qualities a) and b). 
Cost and Market Theory Related Considera-
tions  
One of the cardinal features of information goods is 
the fact that the original production is generally very 
expensive, while the reproduction cost of an information 
good - once it has been created - converges on zero. Thus, 
the marginal cost of (re)production is minimal (Varian 
1995). The production of a complex movie, for example, 
costs several hundred million dollars, while the cost of 
production of the copies for distribution is negligible by 
comparison (Shapiro and Varian 1998)1. This is one of the 
main reasons why the classic cost-based price setting (unit 
price = unit cost + margin), which can often be found in 
practice (Hansen 1990), cannot sensibly be applied to 
information goods (Shapiro and Varian 1998). The more 
units are produced of an information  good, the lower the 
average cost per unit becomes. Apart from these econo-
mies of scale, the cost structure of information goods 
shows another peculiarity: the biggest share of original 
production costs and thus fixed costs is accounted for by 
sunk costs (Varian 1998). 
The essential cost characteristics of information goods 
can be summarized as follows (Shapiro and Varian 1998): 
1. The original production of information goods is very 
cost intensive, while the marginal cost of reproduc-
tion (making of copies) is almost negligible. 
2. Once the original of an information good has been 
produced, the largest share of total costs (including 
reproduction) has already been incurred. A large per-
centage of these costs (depending on the specific in-
formation good) is sunk costs. 
                                                          
1
 It must be noted, however, that using an information 
good (I1) in the production of another digital information 
good (I2) as an input factor not belonging to the producer 
of I2 can - as a result of copyright payments - lead to 
marginal costs which are significantly higher than zero 
(Whinston, Stahl, and Choi 1997). 
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 3. There are no "natural" capacity limits to the produc-
tion of copies, which means that the cost per copy 
remains the same, irrespective of whether ten copies 
or one thousand copies are made. 
Obviously, the cost characteristics of information 
goods described above also affect price management. The 
main impact is that a market for information goods can 
never be a perfect market in a neoclassical sense, since 
the price for digital information goods is not zero and is 
thus higher than the marginal cost (Whinston, Stahl, and-
Choi 1997). The goods traded in electronic information 
markets are not homogenous, in particular because varia-
tions of already produced goods can easily be created by 
simple and inexpensive - even automated - copying pro-
cedures (Shapiro and Varian 1998).  
In order to be able to engage in price discrimination, 
the supplier's price-demand function simply has to show a 
monopolistic section, i.e., also the company's individual 
demand curve, and not only the total demand curve of the 
market must show a declining slope. Price-demand func-
tions of companies that operate in imperfect markets show 
a monopolistic section, which means that dq/dp<0 at least 
for a section of the demand function q=q(p). Measures of 
price discrimination are taken within this monopolistic 
section of the price-demand function (Fantapié Altobelli 
1992). 
Price Discrimination and Bundling 
As is known from utility theory, consumers can assign 
different utility levels, i.e., differing extents of the capac-
ity to satisfy their needs, even to objectively well equiva-
lent goods. Consequently, they are prepared to pay differ-
ent prices for identical or similar goods. These different 
utility levels represent different maximum prices (reserva-
tion prices) which individual consumers are ready to pay 
for the product in question. The real demander structure is 
thus always heterogeneous (Brösse 1997), as are the in-
comes of the demanders. Therefore, it is well possible that 
a customer who assigns the same utility to a good as an-
other customer does not buy the good at all - for budget-
ary reasons - or prefers a cheaper version of the basically 
identical good over the more expensive one. An example 
may be the decision between traveling first or second 
class on a train (Ekelund 1970). If this difference in will-
ingness to pay is exploited, new potentials of increasing 
profits open themselves to companies. In other words, the 
consumer surplus - i.e., the profit lost to suppliers as a 
result of the different levels of willingness to pay on the 
part of consumers - should be tapped. Ideally, the price 
which a consumer is prepared to pay can be agreed indi-
vidually, the prerequisite being that the demand function 
shows a monopolistic section, i.e. at least partly fulfills 
the condition q=q(p) with dq/dp<0 mentioned above 
(Huber 1994). 
Another precondition for price discrimination is the 
segmentation of the market into separate submarkets or 
market segments (Hüpen and Tycho 1981). This segmen-
tation can - for example - be achieved by (seemingly) 
different versions of a product. It is not whether the prod-
ucts actually are different or not, but rather if they are 
perceived as different by the consumers. Thus, the sup-
plier must be in a position to realize several price-quantity 
combinations simultaneously (Stackelberg 1939). Obvi-
ously, suppliers are only interested in price discrimination 
if it entails an increase in profits. In other words, it must 
earn more than the cost of its realization (Kortmann 
1997). The literature differentiates between price dis-
crimination of the first, second, or third degree (Pigou 
1960). 
First-degree, or perfect, price discrimination means 
that each single buyer of a product is charged his/her 
reservation price (Varian 1995). In (Shapiro and Varian 
1998) and (Tacke 1989), a personalization of the price is 
equated with first-degree price discrimination. If all con-
sumers were actually charged their reservation price, the 
consumer surplus would be scooped up completely.  
Second-degree price discrimination, or non-linear 
price setting, means that consumers pay different unit 
prices for different quantities of the same product 
(Hirshey, Pappas, and Whigham 1993). 
The term 'third-degree price discrimination' is used for 
cases where different consumer groups are charged differ-
ent prices, with the essential feature here being that these 
groups show different demand functions with different 
price elasticities (Varian 1985). 
Additionally bundling offers also opportunities for 
suppliers to increase their profits (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 
1999a). 
The analysis of bundling strategies for digital goods 
shows that selling digital goods in large bundles instead 
of individually may nearly eliminate deadweight losses 
and additionally bundling strategies have the ability to 
extract more profits from the consumers than selling the 
goods separately. Bundling has the potential to transform 
consumer surplus in additional profits for the supplier 
(Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999b). 
Economic analysis has shown that bundling strategies 
are particularly attractive if marginal cost of reproduction 
are zero or very low, what is true for digital goods. The 
reductions in marginal costs made possible by low-cost 
digital processing and storage of information will favor 
bundling strategies, while reductions in transaction and 
distribution costs made possible by global computer net-
works will favor unbundling strategies (Bakos and Bryn-
jolfsson 1999a). 
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 Online Newspapers 
Digitized information goods are very heterogeneous, 
i.e. it is not reasonable to use for completely different 
goods like music, technical information, or online news-
papers the same pricing policy. Therefore a special field 
was chosen for the empirical investigation: online news-
papers. 
Online newspapers were selected because they are 
wide spread and common internet services. (Meyer 1999) 
shows that there are already 5000 online newspapers in 
the web. The vast majority are US products, Europe holds 
by approximately 800. 
Online newspapers are digitized versions of classical 
print media. In the traditional print media industry differ-
ential pricing (e.g. monthly or yearly subscription rates) 
and bundling (e.g. if you buy two products from one pub-
lisher you get them cheaper as if you buy them separate) 
are common practices – which is not true for online 
newspapers. 
The online newspaper industry suffers from the web 
users general unwillingness to pay which is especially 
true for content. An international study conducted by 
(Kenney, Gorelik, and Mwangi 2000) verifies this. Hun-
dred online newspapers were analyzed but only one – the 
Wall Street Journal - charges a fee. 
In the field of special interest magazines the use of 
pricing methods for online versions is more common, e.g. 
variety.com a magazine for the entertainment industry 
charges a monthly subscription rate of US $33. Existing 
subscribers to one of the print versions receive a specially 
discounted subscription rate of US $15. 
The Wall Street Journal executes the same strategy for 
their online version. They charge non-print subscribers 
US $59, print subscribers US $29 per year. 
The New York Times executes a different strategy, 
readers have to register but access is free. Only the ar-
chive generates income on the enduser market: The ar-
chive allows a search for articles from the last 365 days of 
The New York Times. Searching is free; but for printing 
an article or saving it on your computers hard disc you 
have to purchase this article (text-only) for $2.50. 
Research Questions 
The basic question in this context is: “Why are all of 
the online news papers offered for free?” 
This is indeed surprising because their traditional 
counterparts are not free and traditional news papers can 
never provide the same convenience enhancing features 
like online newspapers. So online news papers are creat-
ing obviously an additional value for the consumers – 
which in terms of utility theory should lead to an even 
higher price compared to classical newspapers - but in 
practice no price is charged for them. 
For answering the basic question mentioned above, 
the question was operationalized, i.e. decomposed in five 
specific research questions: 
1. Why should readers use the online newspapers? 
2. What are the tasks of online newspapers? 
3. How useful are theoretical pricing and bundling con-
cepts for the online newspapers? 
4. What will be the major income sources for online 
newspapers? 
5. Are electronic (micro) payment methods necessary if 
online newspapers should be sold? 
Method & Design of the Study 
The study focuses on the supply side, i.e. consumers 
are not includes in the samples. The study was completed 
as explorative qualitative research based on an analysis of 
the web sites of the online newspapers and expert inter-
views. The duration of one interview was between 60 and 
90 minutes, twenty interviews were executed. The inter-
viewees were managers of Austrian online newspapers. 
Therefore two different samples have been used: 
1. For the analysis of the web sites of the online news-
papers:  
All 37 Austrian online newspapers were analyzed. 
2. For the expert interviews: 
Here the sample size was 20. These twenty inter-
views corresponds to 24 online newspapers, because 
of ownership structure some managers are responsi-
ble for more than one online newspaper. 
The reason for the restriction on the supply side and 
why expert interviews were selected as method for data 
collection interviews is, that the responsible managers of 
online newspapers are the persons who have the greatest 
insight and knowledge of their sales strategies. 
Findings of the Study 
The period of analysis started with February 21st and 
ended with March 16th, 2000. Within this period 37 web 
versions of Austrian newspapers have been identified. 
Table 1 gives an overview about the use of internet spe-
cific features and compares them with international data 
taken from (Kenney, Gorelik, and Mwangi 2000). 
The comparison shows that Austrian online newspa-
pers have international standard, only the availability of e-
mail addresses of reporters (on the papers homepage) is 
still missing completely. 
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 Tab.1: Comparison of Austrian and international on-
line newspapers (source for international data: (Kenney, 
Gorelik, and Mwangi 2000)), n(Austria)= 37, n(International)= 100 
Characteristics Austria International 
Search engine 38% 23% 
News prominently placed on the 
homepage 
81% 83% 
Hyperlinks within stories 27% 33% 
Some type of hyperlinks 100% 52% 
No e-mail address of the reporter of 
the main story 
100% 36% 
Chat rooms 38% 12% 
Discussion groups 35% 17% 
Feedback mechanism 100% 49% 
At least one e-mail address dis-
played on homepage 
59% 51% 
 
The most important tasks of online newspapers is a 
close to real time information and the implementation of 
new forms of communication with readers/users. 
The close to real time character of the information 
necessary for online newspapers transforms them into 
something like news agencies. 
Figure 1 shows what the managers regard as most im-
portant tasks of online newspapers. 
Figure 1: Tasks of online newspapers, n=20 
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The necessity of new forms of communication with 
the readers implies that the style of journalistic work has 
to change due to interactivity. The journalists have to 
respond to user requests and have to integrate user plat-
forms for communication, like communities in their work. 
This development is of course an empowerment of the 
readers because their articles may become as important or 
maybe even more important than the work of the journal-
ists. 
In figure 1 we see that other aspects are regarded as 
important tasks, too. Especially interesting is the mention-
ing of infotainment. In Austria, newspapers are tradition-
ally less entertainment oriented. This will probably 
change in the case of online newspapers. 
The managers identified several reasons why consum-
ers might use online newspapers the most important are: 
1. actuality,  
2. feedback mechanisms, 
3. archive, 
4. more detailed information, 
5. use of search mechanisms, and 
6. personalization 
All these issues should help to make a distinction be-
tween online newspapers and their traditional counter-
parts. The managers generally do not see the online ver-
sion as substitutes for traditional newspapers but as new 
products. 
Online newspapers should provide new services and a 
content that is a complement to the content of the paper- 
based versions. The vast majority of the managers of 
Austrian online newspapers are planning to create com-
plementary products, whereby the traditional news papers 
should provide a basic and broad information and the 
online newspapers have the task to provide in depth in-
formation, feedback mechanisms, archives and personal-
ized services. Therefore, the revenue sources of tradi-
tional and online newspapers are partly different. 
Figure2: Major income source of online newspapers, n=20 
multiple votes were possible  
18
14
9
4
3
1
1
1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Advertising
E-Commerce Cooperation
with Trading Companies 
New Spheres of Business,
e.g. Providing Infrastructure
Sales Revenues
Symbiosis of Public Relations
and Articles
Platform Services for
E-Business
Classified Advertisments
Online Newspapers will always
need Financial Support
 
Almost all managers said that advertising is a possible 
source of revenues but the majority of the managers 
added that advertising alone will not be sufficient for 
creating profits. The managers think that without engag-
ing in classical e-commerce activities the income will not 
be high enough to cover the costs. 
This means that online newspapers will have to coop-
erate with other businesses, such as retailing companies 
so that the specific knowledge of both companies can be 
used for mutual benefits. 
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 The managers think that they have to identify new 
types of business for their online versions, types that have 
not been interesting for the paper-based versions. The 
most quoted example was the provision of web shops. 
The managers think that they have the technological 
knowledge of implementing and running such an elec-
tronic market. They simply need partners (some call them 
customers) who are willing to sell their products via the 
web shops of the online newspapers. 
Entering "new spheres of business" means that the 
managers are thinking about using the specific knowledge 
of their staff in other lines of business. All of the great 
Austrian online newspapers are thinking about an exten-
sion of their provider function. They want to extend from 
pure content provision to content and infrastructure provi-
sion. Some of them have done so already. 
Figure 3: Possibility of pricing of services in the enduser 
market, n=20 
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Surprisingly selling the online version to the consum-
ers is regarded as less important. Few mangers mentioned 
a generally accepted missing micropayment method but 
the majority (18 out of 20) think that providing traditional 
payment methods would have a positive influence on 
sales and therefore missing suitable electronic payment 
systems are generally not regarded as reason why online 
newspapers are given away for free. 
The managers believe that the main reason for a price 
equal to zero is an “unlucky” market development and 
that there is no logical reason why value generating ser-
vices are given away for free. 
Tab. 2: Usefulness of pricing concepts, n=20 
Pricing Method Useful for 
Online 
Newspapers 
Not Useful for 
Online News-
papers 
Differential Pricing in 
General 
8 12 
Versioning 15 5 
Bundling 13 7 
Non-linear pricing 14 6 
Personalization 18 2 
Due to a good market transparency the managers re-
gard differential pricing generally as difficult. The most 
appropriate concept is for the managers personalization, 
followed by non-linear pricing (just for the archive), ver-
sioning and bundling. 
Nevertheless, the managers of Austrian online news 
papers are optimistic that they can generate some profit 
with their products in the near future. They believe that 
the majority of income will be earned by cooperating with 
other businesses in the electronic commerce area. 
Conclusions and Summary 
1. Why readers should use online newspapers? 
Online newspapers provide more recent information 
than their traditional counterparts. Additional special 
value added services create more utility for the users. 
2. What are the tasks of online newspapers? 
Online newspapers have to provide a new mode of 
communication, i.e. the traditional mass communication 
model – which implies a clear distinction between sender 
and receiver of information – is obsolete. Online newspa-
pers are interactive communication platforms, where the 
opinion of a “reader” may become as important as the 
reporters’ opinion. 
Online newspapers have the ability to serve as data-
bases, therefore providing an archive is a “must have 
feature”. The same is true for personalized information 
services (including push technologies). 
Online newspapers should be more entertainment ori-
ented than their paper based cousins. 
3. How useful are theoretical pricing and bundling 
concepts for the practice? 
The managers agreed that personalization (a kind of 
first degree price discrimination) is the best concept for 
online newspapers. This means that the users will pay 
only for personalized, highly specific information. 
Group pricing (e.g. different versions of an online 
news paper) and bundling strategies were found to be 
minor important because of the possibility of personaliza-
tion. Therefore it can be concluded that the customers are 
not willing to pay for different versions/bundles but only 
for offers perfectly tailored to their personal needs. 
Non linear pricing (2nd degree price discrimination) is 
neither useful for personalized information services nor 
for access to the classical newspaper content, but it is a 
suitable method for pricing archive inquiries. 
4. What will be the major income sources for online 
newspapers? 
Selling services to consumers – with or without price 
discrimination – will be only of minor importance in 
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 future. The greatest share of future revenues will be gen-
erated in the business to business area. 
Surprisingly the managers said, that classical advertis-
ing (e.g. banner) will not be the major income source in 
the business to business field. Online newspapers have to 
enter new spheres of business. They have to seek coopera-
tion with other companies interested in e-business and 
provide platforms for online-shoppers or provide elec-
tronic markets by themselves. 
5. Are electronic (micro) payment methods necessary if 
online newspapers should be sold? 
Electronic (micropayment) methods are helpful but 
not necessary. Contrary the majority of the managers 
think that providing traditional payment methods (e.g. 
giro inpayment form, classical account to account money 
transfer) has a positive influence on sales. 
Pricing and bundling strategies do not play an impor-
tant role within the sales concepts of managers of online 
newspapers, primarily because the managers believe that 
the revenue potential in the enduser market is very low 
and therefore they focus on other income sources. 
The managers of Austrian online news papers are 
convinced that their products will generate profits in the 
near future, but the majority of the income will be gener-
ated in the business to business area of electronic com-
merce. As selling an information good is not the type of 
business online newspapers will do in the b2b field differ-
ential pricing and bundling will not be employed in this 
area. 
Some earnings will be made in enduser markets too, 
especially with personalized information services, the 
archives of the online newspapers and classified adver-
tisements, i.e. price discrimination and bundling will be 
used here. But as the b2c market is only responsible for a 
small amount of online newspapers’ profits, generally 
speaking differential pricing and bundling do not play an 
important role for them. 
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